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Does Investor Protection Regime Affect the Effectiveness of Outside
Directorship on the Board?

Abstract
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in U.S., there has been a general tendency to
globally harmonize regulations and practices of board governance. The purpose of this study is
to compare among countries how well the board of directors constrains earnings management.
Using a sample of firms from 23 countries, we document some evidence that higher outside
directorship on the board is associated with lower earnings management in the international
context. We also find that there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of board outside
directorship in constraining earnings management between high and low investor protection
countries. Our findings mitigate a concern that harmonized corporate governance in low investor
protection countries may not work.
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JEL codes: G3, K2, M4
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1.

Introduction
The United States Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 in order to provide

effective corporate governance to publicly listed firms. The enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act strengthens the accountability of the board of directors, which leads to higher representation
of outside directors in the composition of the board (Valenti, 2008). Following the enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many other countries also implemented similar regulations and
practices of corporate governance to increase the accountability of board members. For
example, the U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Department of Trade and Industry issued
the Higgs Review in January 2003, which proposed guidelines on improving board effectiveness,
and Canadian regulatory bodies instituted federal regulatory reform to improve corporate
governance such as National Instrument 52-109, equivalent to Sarbanes-Oxley but for the audit
requirement on internal control systems.
The general tendency has been towards globally harmonized regulations and practices of
board governance. However, concerns remain. It is yet unclear that regulation of and practices
by the board of directors will in fact converge to an appropriate global threshold of effectiveness
of board governance. Thus, comparing among countries how well the board of directors
monitors the management can provide an implication for the costs and benefits of the
international convergence of both regulations and practices of corporate governance.
Outside directorship on the board (i.e., board independence) reflects the extent to which
the board can maintain its independence in overseeing the financial reporting process. Prior
research (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Xie et al., 2003; Vafeas, 2005) finds that firms with high board
independence on the board have lower earnings management than firms with low board
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independence. Nevertheless, extant studies on the effectiveness of board governance are limited
to the context of a single country.
Differences in national institutional infrastructures, however, likely influence the
effectiveness of board governance and generate variation among countries. La Porta et al. (1999)
suggest that corporate governance environments are different between countries with strong
investor protection and countries with weak investor protection. Thus, differences in laws and
regulations regarding investor protection may influence the effectiveness of outside directorship
on the board. On the one hand, the effectiveness of board governance may be lower in weak
investor protection countries than in strong investor protection countries. When investor
protection is weak, controlling shareholders and managers may wield significant influence over
the board and thereby impair the effectiveness of board governance. In addition, outside
directors may have less incentive to monitor managers in weak investor protection countries
because of lower reputational losses and risk of lawsuits.
On the other hand, weak investor protection is associated with more agency problems,
which may lead to a higher demand for corporate governance in that country. Lang et al. (2004)
and Kwon et al. (2007) suggest that there could be a substitute relationship between investor
protection and the corporate governance mechanism. It is also likely that the effectiveness of
board governance is higher in weak investor protection countries than in strong investor
protection countries.
Moreover, if the complimentary effect of investor protection on corporate governance is
offset against the substitute effect of investor protection on corporate governance, there will be
no significant difference in the effectiveness of board governance between strong and weak

2

investor protection countries. Thus, whether investor protection influences the effectiveness of
outside directorship on the board becomes an empirical question.
While comparing the effectiveness of board governance across countries is warranted,
research on this issue is highly limited to the data availability. Lack of international board
governance data is due to two reasons. First, there are no electronic databases providing the
multi-country data on board governance. Hand data collection is necessary but time consuming.
Second, even though we hand collect the data, there are few data sources that can provide
information on board governance of companies from various countries in English. Thanks to the
Business Week website, we hand collect the data on board independence from 23 countries. To
the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one to develop a data set of international board
independence. The uniqueness of our data set not only enriches the international corporate
governance research but also provides some implications to researchers for collecting
international board governance data.
Our study examines both whether earnings management is negatively related to outside
directorship on the board in the international context and whether investor protection influences
the relationship between earnings management and outside directorship on the board. We find
some evidence that outside directors on the board can effectively constrain earnings management
across countries. We also find that there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of
outside directorship on the board in constraining earnings management between strong and weak
investor protection countries. Our findings suggest that the effectiveness of board governance
will not decrease with either international convergence of corporate regulations and practices of
board governance or the range of strong to weak investor protection regimes.
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Our study contributes to the literature in the following two ways. First, previous studies
(e.g., Klein, 2002a; Xie, et al. 2003; Vafeas, 2005) use the data from a specific national context,
whereas our study focuses on the international context. Our findings suggest that the results on
the outside directorship on the board from a specific context are generalize-able to the
international context. Our study contributes to the growth of harmonization of corporate
regulations and practices on board governance across countries by extending empirical evidence
in support of global corporate governance regime thus contributing to the public policy debate in
the post Sarbanes-Oxley period.
Second, our study enriches the limited research on the relationship between investor
protection and corporate governance mechanisms. Lang et al. (2004) focus on the relationship
between investor protection and analyst coverage, while Kwon et al. (2007) and Francis and
Wang (2008) focus on the relationship between investor protection and external auditing. Unlike
those studies, we focus on the relationship between investor protection and board governance.
Our study also adds to a stream of research on the effectiveness of board governance in
enhancing financial reporting quality.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce theoretical background and
develop hypotheses in section 2, discuss research design in section 3, present empirical results in
section 4, and conclude in section 5.

2.

Theoretical background and hypotheses development

2.1.

The effect of board independence on earnings management
The separation of ownership and control creates agency costs arising from adverse

selection and moral hazard. Managers may behave for their private purposes at the expense of
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shareholders’ interests. One way to solve these agency problems is the oversight of the
company’s activities by the board of directors.
One of the important duties of the board of directors and its committees is to monitor the
financial reporting process, for example, to review the choice of accounting and disclosure
policies, oversee the internal control process, and hire external auditors. As outside directors on
the board are non-executive directors unaffiliated with the management, they are more likely to
be independent of the management and thus more effectively monitor the management.
Moreover, outside directors have incentive to oversee managers because managerial opportunism
may impair their reputation and increase the risk of lawsuits. Thus, firms with high board
independence may engage in less earnings management.
U.S. studies on the board of directors verify the positive impact of board independence on
earnings management. Klein (2002a) examines whether earnings management is associated with
board independence and audit committee independence. She reports that board independence
and audit committee independence are negatively related to abnormal accruals, suggesting that
the board and audit committees structured to be more independent of the management are more
effective in constraining earnings management. Likewise, Xie et al. (2003) find that lower
abnormal accruals are associated with greater board independence.
Using the likelihood of reporting a marginal earnings increase or avoiding a negative
earnings surprise to measure earnings management, Vafeas (2005) examine the effect of the
structures of the board and audit committees on earnings quality.1 He reports that firms with
high audit committee independence are less likely to report small earnings increase than firms
with low outside directorship on audit committees. He also reports that an increase in board

1

Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) use the prospect theory and costs of transactions with stakeholders to explain
why firms manage earnings to avoid earnings decrease.
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independence is associated with a decrease in the likelihood of avoiding negative earnings
surprise. These results are consistent with the notion that outside directorship is effective in
reducing the incidence of earnings management.
Corresponding to the U.S. studies, there are several studies using data from a single nonU.S. country to examine the effect of board independence on earnings management. Firth et al.
(2007) find that the more independent the board, the more effective is the board in constraining
earnings management, suggesting that outside directorship might have reduced earnings
management in China. Using a sample of Australian firms, Davidson et al. (2005) investigate
the role of a firm’s internal governance structure in constraining earnings management. They
find that both board and audit committee independence are associated with a lower likelihood of
earnings management.
Nevertheless, some non-U.S. studies do not find evidence on the negative association
between board independence and earnings management. Chin et al. (2006) examine whether the
incidence of earnings management around SEOs depends on corporate governance structures,
and find no evidence that higher board independence leads to lower earnings management in
Hong Kong. As opposed to the results in U.S., Bradbury et al. (2006) find an insignificant
association between earnings management and outside directorship on the board for Singapore
and Malaysian firms.
In summary, although the U.S. studies indicate that board independence plays an effective
governance role, it is not clear whether this corporate governance mechanism can work
internationally, especially for countries that have significantly different institutions than U.S.
This concern is due to the higher ownership concentration in many non-U.S. countries, where the
main agency problem could be the expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling

6

shareholders as a result of the separation of controlling shareholders’ cash-flow rights (i.e.,
ownership) from their control rights (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000).
The conflict of interest between minority and controlling shareholders may have a dual
effect on board governance. On the one hand, board independence is likely to be weakened by
the entrenchment of controlling shareholders who wield significant influence over the board,
which increases earnings management. On the other hand, more agency problems arising from
the conflict of interest between minority and controlling shareholders provide more opportunities
to outside directors to play their monitoring role if they really protect the interest of minority
shareholders. In this case, board independence may be more effective in constraining earnings
management. Based on the U.S. studies, we formulate the first hypothesis as follows:
H1. Earnings management is negatively associated with outside directorship on the board in
the international context.

2.2.

The effect of investor protection on the effectiveness of board independence
La Porta et al. (1998) find that common-law countries have stronger investor protection

than civil-law countries, suggesting that investor protection varies across countries. In weak
investor protection countries, there are few internal and external constrains that might prevent
and discourage managers and controlling shareholders from opportunistic behavior. For
example, it is more difficult to pursue legal actions again managers and controlling shareholders
for their expropriation of minority shareholders in those countries (Leuz et al., 2003). Thus, it is
likely that earnings quality is lower in weak investor protection countries than in strong investor
protection countries.
Based on La Porta et al. (1998), researchers compare earnings quality between countries
with different legal environment and investor protection. Ball et al. (2000) report that earnings
7

are more timely and less smoothed in common law countries than in civil law countries,
suggesting that common law countries have a higher demand for timely public disclosure to
mitigate information asymmetry and engage in less earnings management than civil law
countries. Hung (2001) finds that both countries with accounting systems using accruals more
extensively and countries with strong investor protection have higher value relevance of
accounting earnings. Her findings suggest that strong investor protection may enhance the
benefits of accrual accounting by constraining opportunism.
Leuz et al. (2003) examine earnings management in the international context. They
document that the level of earnings management, including the absolute value of accruals and
income smoothing, is lower in countries with high investor protection than in countries with low
investor protection, consistent with the notion that investor protection can constrain earnings
management. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine whether legal and political institutions
affect accounting conservatism across countries, and find that bad news is reflected more timely
in accounting earnings in strong investor protection countries than in weak investor protection
countries. DeFond et al. (2007) document evidence that the annual earnings announcements are
more informative in countries with strong investor protection. In summary, prior research
suggests that higher investor protection is associated with higher quality earnings.
The effectiveness of board independence in monitoring the financial reporting process
may vary with the level of investor protection. On the one hand, low investor protection
environments may weaken the monitoring role of outside directors. In countries with low
investor protection, companies are less widely held, which facilitates the expropriation of
minority shareholders’ earnings by controlling shareholders and managers. These controlling
shareholders and managers may exert higher influence on the decisions made by the board of
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directors. In order to engage in opportunistic activities, they may have more incentive to impair
the effectiveness of board governance. Jaggi et al. (2009) find that the monitoring effectiveness
of independent boards is lower in family-controlled firms.
In addition, outside directors in weak investor protection environments are both less
vulnerable to reputational losses and less likely to experience monetary penalties arising from
corporate fraud. Thus, outside directors may be less liable in weak investor protection countries
than in strong investor protection countries.
DeFond and Hung (2004) examine the effect of investor protection on the association
between CEO turnover and poor performance. They document that investor protection enhances
the association between CEO turnover and poor performance. Since good corporate governance
will terminate CEOs who perform poorly, the association between CEO turnover and poor
performance may reflect the quality of corporate governance. Thus, their findings suggest that
weak investor protection may be associated with a low quality of corporate governance. Francis
and Wang (2008) investigate the effect of investor protection on the audit quality differentiation
between Big 4 auditors and non-Big 4 auditors. They find that the higher audit quality of Big 4
auditors relative to non-Big 4 auditors is more pronounced in strong investor protection countries
than in weak investor protection countries. Their results indicate a complement relationship
between investor protection and corporate governance.
On the other hand, outside directors may play a more important monitoring role in weak
investor protection environments. La Porta et al. (1999) suggest that there might exist more
agency problems resulting from concentrated ownership structures in weak investor protection
countries. If outside directors in those countries are really independent of controlling
shareholders and managers, they will have more opportunities to solve agency problems than in
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strong investor protection countries. Hence, there may be a higher demand for effective board
governance in weak investor protection countries.
Lang et al. (2004) investigate the relationship among ownership structure, analyst
following, investor protection, and valuation in 27 countries. They examine whether the
presence of concentrated family / management control and analyst coverage interactively affects
firm valuation. They document a stronger positive interaction effect of the presence of
concentrated family / management control and analyst coverage on firm valuation in weak
investor protection countries than in strong investor protection.2 Since analyst coverage is a type
of corporate governance mechanism, their results suggest that analysts may play a more
important governance role in weak investor protection than in strong investor protection
countries. In a study of international auditor industry specialization, Kwon et al. (2007) find that
earnings quality is more positively associated with auditor industry specialization in weak
investor protection countries than in strong investor protection countries. These studies suggest
that corporate governance may substitute to investor protection.
Taken together, whether board independence is complimentary to or substitutes for
investor protection could be considered an empirical question. If the complement (substitute)
effect of investor protection on outside directorship overwhelmingly dominates over the
substitute (complement) effect of investor protection on outside directorship, the effectiveness of
board independence in constraining earnings management will be higher (lower) in strong
investor protection countries than in weak investor protection countries. It is also likely that the
complement effect is offset against the substitute effect and thus the difference in the
effectiveness of board independence is insignificant between strong and weak investor protection

2

The positive interaction effect of the presence of concentrated family / management control and analyst
coverage indicates that the expropriation of minority shareholders may be lower when more analysts follow firms.
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countries. Since the directional effect of investor protection on the effectiveness of board
independence in constraining earnings management is not clear, we develop the second
hypothesis in the null form:
H2. The negative association between earnings management and outside directorship on the
board is not affected by investor protection.

3.

Research design

3.1.

Sample selection
We begin to collect the financial data used in our analysis for year 2007 from the

Compustat Global database. We choose 2007 as the sample year because the Business Week
website provided the data of the board of directors only for year 2007 when we collected the data
for this study. We select sample firms from all countries included in the Compustat Global
database except for U.S. as long as the data are available for our analyses. We exclude U.S.
firms as our study focuses on the effectiveness of board independence in non-U.S. countries.
Since U.S. has the uniqueness of legal environment and investor protection, another concern on
including U.S. firms in the sample is that the results may be driven by the U.S. context.
While we collect the financial data from the Compustat Global database, we have to hand
collect the data on board independence from the Business Week website. For a country covered
by the Compustat Global database, in which there are more than 100 firms in 2007, we randomly
select 100 firms from the database as our sample firms for that country. We select all firms as
our sample firms for a country if there are less than 100 firms in that country. This procedure
yields a raw sample of 1,427 firms across 24 countries, which have the financial data used in the
analyses. Next, we collect the data of directors for raw sample firms from the Business Week
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website,3 which provides the information about outside and inside directors of companies in
various countries. After excluding raw sample firms for which the data on directors are not
available from the Business Week website, the final sample consists of 629 firms across 23
countries.
Table 1 reports the frequencies and percents of 629 sample firms by country. A large
proportion of our sample firms are from Singapore (11.76%), Australia (10.81%), and Canada
(10.49%), while a small proportion of our sample firms are from Denmark (0.64%), Indonesia
(0.64%), Switzerland (0.95%), and Mexico (0.95%). We note the over representation of
Singapore, Australia, and Canada in our sample. We use two ways to control for the effect of
country dominance. The first way is to include these three dominance countries’ dummies in the
model. The second way is to include all countries’ dummies when we conduct the third
additional analysis.
Insert Table 1 about here
3.2.

Regression models
We first estimate the following regression model to test H1:

EM = b0 + b1 BDIND + b2 INVP + b3 MB + b4 SIZE + b5 LEV + b6 LOSS + b7 XLS +b8 BIG4
+ b9 OWNC + b10 IFRS +Dominance country dummies + ε

(1)

where EM is earnings management, measured as the ratio of the absolute value of total accruals
to the absolute value of cash flow from operations. BDIND is board independence, measured as
the proportion of outside directors on the board. INVP is investor protection, measured by legal
enforcement scores. Following Leuz et al. (2003), legal enforcement scores are the average of
three measures from La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) the rule
of law, and (3) level of corruption in a country. We use legal enforcement as a measure of
3

http: //investing. businessweek.com/research/common/symbollookup/ symbollookup.asp
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investor protection because Durnev and Kim (2005) point out that strong investor protection
laws can be ineffective if they are not enforced. In the additional analyses, we also use antidirector rights, legal origin, and institutional clusters as alternative measures of investor
protection.
MB is market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of the market value of common equity
to the book value of common equity. SIZE is firm size, measured as the logarithm of total assets.
LEV is financial leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. LOSS is lossmaking dummy, coded “1” if a firm is making loss and “0” otherwise. XLS is cross listing, coded
“1” if a firm is cross listed on a U.S. stock exchange and “0” otherwise. BIG4 is Big 4 auditor,
coded “1” if a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and “0” otherwise. OWNC is ownership
concentration, measured by ownership concentration scores from La Porta et al. (1998). IFRS is
IFRS adoption, coded “1” if a country has mandatorily adopted IFRS and “0” otherwise. Since
firms from Singapore, Australia, and Canada are dominated in our sample, we include the
dummies of these three countries to control for their over representation.
Prior research on earnings management (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Xie et al., 2003) usually uses
the Jones (1991) model to estimate discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings management.
Unlike our study, these studies collect the data only from one country. There are two reasons for
not choosing discretionary accruals as the main proxy for earnings management in this study.
First, it is unclear whether the Jones (1991) model performs equally well in measuring
earnings management among countries. Second, using discretionary accruals will
significantly reduce the sample size and thus statistical power for this study. However,
we still use discretionary accruals as an alternative measure of earnings management in
an additional analysis.
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Our proxy for earnings management used in the main tests is measured as the absolute
value of total accruals deflated by the absolute value of cash flow from operations. We choose
this measure as the main proxy for earnings management for two reasons. First, extant
international studies on earnings management (e.g., Leuz et al., 2003; Sun, 2009) employ this
measure. These studies also select the data from various countries. Second, using this measure
can avoid the significant reduction in sample size, which is crucially important for international
studies with data constraints. Like Leuz et al. (2003), we also use income smoothing as an
alternative measure of earnings management in an additional analysis.
If outside directors are more effective in constraining earnings management than inside
directors in the international context, we expect that the coefficient on board independence (b1)
will be negative and significant. We include INVP in model (1) because Leuz et al. (2003) find
that earnings management is lower in countries with strong investor protection than in countries
with weak investor protection. MB is added in model (1) as Klein (2002b) find that the marketto-book ratio is positively associated with earnings management. Armstrong et al. (2010) assert
that large firms provide high quality information, suggesting that large firms may have less
earnings management. However, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that large firms have high
political costs, which may lead to more earnings management. Thus, we include SIZE in model
(1) although the effect of firm size on earnings management could be negative or positive. Klein
(2002a) also finds that financial leverage is positively associated with the absolute value of
discretionary accruals. Francis et al. (2004) find that accrual quality is lower for firms that
incurred losses, suggesting that earnings management is positively associated with loss-making.
We include XLS in the model because firms cross-listed on the U. S. stock exchanges may
have higher accounting quality. Since Big 4 auditors provide high quality audit, earnings
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management may be lower for firms audited by Big 4 auditors than for firms audited by non-Big
4 auditors (Becker et al., 1998). Prior research (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997) indicates that concentrated ownership may have both positive and negative impact
on corporate governance. Barth et al. (2008) find that firms applying IFRS have less earnings
management. Thus, we also include BIG4, OWNC, and IFRS in the model. Based on the above
discussion, we expect that b2, b7, b8 and b10 will be negative and that b3, b5, and b6 will be
positive. However, b4 and b9 are expected to be either positive or negative.4, 5
We estimate the following regression model to test H2:
EM = b0 + b1 BDIND + b2 INVP + b3 BDIND*INVP +b4 MB + b5 SIZE + b6 LEV + b7 LOSS
+ b8 XLS +b9 BIG4 + b10 OWNC + b11 IFRS+ Dominance country dummies + ε

(2)

We include the interaction term of BDIND and INVP in model (2). If investor protection affects
the effectiveness of outside directorship in constraining earnings management, then the
coefficient on BDIND*INVP (b3) will be significant.

4.

Empirical results
We report the descriptive statistics in Panel A, Table 2. The mean and median of the

absolute value of accruals deflated by the absolute value of cash flow from operations (EM) are
1.06 and 0.48, respectively. The mean and median of board independence (BDIND) are 0.70 and
0.75, respectively. Thus, on average, about 70% to 75% of directors on the board are outside
directors for our sample firms.
Panel B, Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations among the independent variables. We
find that board independence is not significantly correlated with investor protection, suggesting
that there is no significant difference in the demand for outside directorship across countries.
4
5

INVP is standardized as (INVP –Mean)/Std.
All continuous variables in models (1) and (2) are winsorized at the level of 1% and 99%.
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Not significant correlation between board independence and investor protection also indicates
the internationalization of corporate governance regulations and practices, namely, similar board
structure. The highest correlation coefficient is 0.61 for XLS and BIG4, which indicates that
cross-listed firms in U.S. are more likely to be clients of Big 4 auditors. Since all other absolute
values of correlation coefficients are less than 0.61, multicollinearity is less likely to be a
substantive issue in this study.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 3 reports the results on testing H1. We find that the coefficient on BDIND is
negative and significant (t = -2.40, p < .01), which supports H1. This suggests that international
outside directorship is effective in constraining earnings management in the international
context. Our results are consistent with those documented in a specific context (the U.S. context
in most studies). Like Leuz et al. (2003), we document a negative and significant coefficient on
INVP (t = -2.10, p < .05), consistent with the notion that earnings management is lower in
countries with strong investor protection than in countries with weak investor protection. We
also find that loss-making firms have larger absolute value of accruals. Clients of Big 4 auditors
and firms from countries with high ownership concentration have lower absolute value of
accruals.
Insert Table 3 about here
Table 4 provides the results on testing H2. We find that the coefficient on the interaction
of BDIND and INVP is insignificant, suggesting that investor protection does not affect the
effectiveness of outside directorship in constraining earnings management. Thus, outside
directors may play a similar monitoring role in the financial reporting process across countries.
Insert Table 4 about here
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We also conduct several additional analyses to test the robustness of our results. First, we
use income smoothing as an alternative measure of earnings management. Leuz et al. (2003)
argue that managers may use accounting discretion to conceal poor current performance.
Moreover, managers may also use real business activities to smooth earnings.6 Like Leuz et al.
(2003), we measure income smoothing by the correlation coefficient between changes in total
accruals and changes in cash flows from operations over the period from year t-4 to year t. This
income smoothing measure reflects both accrual and real earnings management. Since a large
negative correlation coefficient between changes in accruals and changes in cash flows from
operations indicates a strong income smoothing, we multiply the correlation coefficient by -1 to
measure earnings management.
Table 5 reports the results when we test the hypotheses using income smoothing as a
measure of earnings management. Columns 3 and 4, Table 5 show the results on testing H1. We
still find that income smoothing is negatively associated with board independence (t = -1.44, p <
.10), consistent with H1. We also find that income smoothing is negatively associated with
investor protection (t = -1.66, p < .05), consistent with Leuz et al. (2003). In addition, we find
that income smoothing is lower for firms cross-listed in U.S., firms incurring losses, clients of
Big 4 auditors, firms from countries with high ownership concentration or countries that have
mandatorily adopted IFRS, while income smoothing is higher for large or high growth firms.
Columns 5 and 6, Table 5 include the results on testing H2. We find that the coefficient on
BDIND*INVP is insignificant. Thus, investor protection does not affect the effectiveness of
outside directors on the board in constraining income smoothing. This suggests that outside
directors may play an equally important role in overseeing financial reporting process wherever
they sit on the board in strong or weak investor protection countries.
6

For example, Bartov (1993) finds that managers use asset sales to manipulate earnings.

17

Insert Table 5 about here
Second, we examine whether the results on testing H2 are sensitive to using alternative
measures of investor protection. We choose anti-director rights, legal origin, and institutional
clusters as alternative measures of investor protection. Anti-director rights indicate the voting
rights of minority shareholders (Leuz et al., 2003). Since La Porta et al. (1998) find that investor
protection is higher in common law countries than in civil law countries, legal origin, which is a
dummy coded “1” for a common law country and “0” for a civil law country, is a proxy for
investor protection. Like Leuz et al. (2003), we classify countries into three institutional clusters.
The third alternative measure of investor protection is a dummy coded “2”, “1”, and “0” for a
country in clusters 1, 2, and 3, respectively.7 The non-tabulated results also show that the
negative association between earnings management and board independence is not affected by
using anti-director rights, legal origin, or institutional clusters. Thus, our results are robust to
these alternative measures of investor protection.
Third, we test the hypotheses by controlling for the fixed country and industry effects.
We included country dummies and industry dummies in models (1) and (2). When we estimate
model (1), we find that the coefficient on BDIND is negative and significant (non-tabulated t = 2.24, p < .05). We also find that the coefficient on BDIND*INVP is insignificant when model
(2) is estimated. Hence, the results still hold after controlling for the fixed country and industry
effects.
Fourth, we examine whether there is any endogeneity problem for using board
independence in our OLS regressions. We use the Hausman endogeneity test as follows. First,
we choose a dummy variable (i.e., ESOX) coded “1” for countries with a mandatory corporate
7

The three institutional clusters are based on the nine institutional variables from La Prota et al. (1997; 1998)
including stock market capitalization, listed firms, IPOs, ownership concentration, anti-director rights, disclosure
index, efficiency of judicial system, rule of law, and corruption index.
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governance code equivalent to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and “0” otherwise as an instrumental
variable of board independence. ESOX can be used as the instrumental variable because these
mandatory corporate governance codes can affect board independence but cannot be affected by
earnings management. Second, we run the first-stage regression as follows:
BDIND = a0 + a1 ESOX + a2 MB + a3 SIZE + a4 LEV + a5 LOSS +ε

(3)

We include MB in model (3) because Bathala and Rao (1995) and Linck et al. (2008) find
that board independence is negatively associated with growth opportunities. Since Lehn et al.
(2003) and Boone et al. (2007) document that board independence is higher for large firms, SIZE
is included in model (3). We add LEV in the model as Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that
financial leverage could be a substitute to corporate governance. We also include LOSS in the
model because Klein (2002b) suggests that firms incurring losses might have a lower demand for
corporate governance.
We find that the coefficient on ESOX is positive and significant (non-tabulated t = 5.96, p
< .01), suggesting that more outside directors sit on the board when countries have mandatory
corporate governance codes equivalent to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Third, we include the
residual value from model (3) (i.e., RBDIND) as an additional regressor in model (1). We then
estimate model (1) and find that the coefficient on RBDIND is insignificant, which indicates that
there is no severe endogeneity problem when we use board independence in our OLS
regressions.
Fifth, we examine whether board independence has different effectiveness in constraining
earnings management between countries with mandatory corporate governance codes equivalent
to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and countries without such codes. We re-estimate model (2) by
replacing INVP with ESOX. We still find that the coefficient on BDIND*ESOX is insignificant.
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Thus, outside directorship is equally effective in constraining earnings management regardless of
whether countries have mandatory corporate governance codes or not.
Sixth, we estimate models (1) and (2) using signed value of accruals. Table 6 includes the
results on directional tests on accruals. We find that the coefficient on BDIND is negative but
insignificant in model (1). We also find that the coefficient on BDIND*INVP is negative and
significant, suggesting that outside directorship may more effectively constrain earnings
management in high investor protection countries than in low investor protection countries.
However, we recommend that these results should be cautiously explained as F-statistic and
adjusted R2 indicate that using signed accruals as the dependent variable in models (1) and (2)
seems statistically problematical.
Insert Table 6 about here
Seventh, we use discretionary accruals as the dependent variable in models (1) and (2).
We compute discretionary accruals for any industry-country using the Jones (1991) model. After
the exclusion of observations omitting discretionary accruals, the sample size dramatically
decreases from 629 to 381 observations. We find insignificant coefficients on board
independence in model (1) and the interaction of board independence and investor protection in
model (2). We also find an insignificant coefficient on investor protection in model (1),
inconsistent with the theory (Leuz et al., 2003). A concern on using discretionary accruals in this
study is that the statistical power of testing the hypotheses is low when the sample size is
dramatically reduced. Thus, the results on discretionary accruals in this study should be
cautiously interpreted.
Eighth, we examine the relationship between board independence and auditor choice.
Beasley and Petroni (2001) document a positive association between board independence and
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audit quality. As Big 4 auditors provide higher quality audit than non-Big 4 auditors (Francis et
al.. 1999), we run the logistic regression by using BIG4 as the dependent variable in the models.
We find a positive and significant coefficient on BDIND in model (1) (non-tabulated χ2 = 1.78, p
< .10), suggesting that outside directors also demand high quality auditors in the international
context. We also find an insignificant coefficient on BDIND*INVP in model (2). Thus, the
results on auditor choice are consistent with the results on earnings management.
Ninth, we examine the relationship between board independence and dividend payouts.
La Porta et al. (2000) suggest that high corporate governance leads to high dividend payouts.
We re-run the logistic regression by replacing the dependent variable in the models with a
dummy variable coded “1” if a firm pays dividends and “0” otherwise. We find that the
coefficient on BDIND in model (1) is positive and significant (non-tabulated χ2 = 1.79, p < .10),
which indicates that firms with high board independence are more likely to pay dividends than
firms with low board independence. Like the results on earnings management, we still find that
the coefficient on BDIND*INVP in model (2) is insignificant.

5.

Conclusion
This study examines whether earnings management is negatively associated with board

independence and whether investor protection affects the association between earnings
management and board independence. We document some international evidence that outside
directors effectively constrain earnings management. We also find that investor protection does
not affect the effectiveness of outside directorship in constraining earnings management. The
results suggest that outside directors may play a similar role in monitoring the financial reporting
process wherever they sit on the board in strong or weak investor protection countries. Thus, our
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findings support the internationalization of regulations and practices on board governance as
evinced by the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
This study provides several implications for future research. First, it is warranted for
future research to improve data availability. Our study has limitations on data collection. Due to
the data constraints, we collect the data only for 2007. We acknowledge that our results might
be affected by the financial crisis that started in 2007. Future research may expand the sample
by collecting more recent data from alternative data sources. Second, it is worth investigating
the relationship between investor protection and the monitoring effectiveness of a particular kind
of corporate governance mechanisms. Our study indicates that the monitoring effectiveness of
board independence is equal across countries, whereas Lang et al. (2004) and Kwon et al. (2007)
suggest that the monitoring effectiveness of analyst coverage and auditor industry specialization
is higher in low investor protection countries than in high investor protection countries. Thus,
the results on one kind of corporate governance mechanisms may not apply to another kind of
corporate governance mechanisms. Third, this study begs a question of why the results on board
independent are inconsistent with those on other corporate governance mechanisms. Future
research might explain why investor protection differently affects the monitoring effectiveness of
various corporate governance mechanisms.
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Table 1
Breakdown of sample firms and investor protection scores
Panel A. Breakdown of sample firms by country
Country Name
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Switzerland
Germany
Denmark
France
United Kingdom
Greece
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Malaysia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Philippines
Singapore
Sweden
Thailand
Taiwan
South Africa
Total

Country Code
AUS
BRA
CAN
CHE
DEU
DNK
FRA
GBR
GRC
HKG
IDN
JPN
KOR
MEX
MYS
NLD
NZL
PHL
SGP
SWE
THA
TWN
ZAF

Frequency
68
9
66
6
25
4
24
54
11
35
4
42
14
6
54
9
14
17
74
31
27
11
24
629
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Percent (%)
10.81
1.43
10.49
0.95
3.97
0.64
3.82
8.59
1.75
5.56
0.64
6.68
2.23
0.95
8.59
1.43
2.23
2.70
11.76
4.93
4.29
1.75
3.82
100.00

(Table 1 continued)
Panel B. Investor protection scores
Country Name
Australia
Brazil
Canada
Switzerland
Germany
Denmark
France
United Kingdom
Greece
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Japan
Korea
Mexico
Malaysia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Philippines
Singapore
Sweden
Thailand
Taiwan
South Africa

INVP
9.51
6.13
9.75
10.00
9.05
10.00
8.68
9.22
6.82
8.91
2.88
9.17
5.55
5.37
7.72
10.00
10.00
3.47
8.93
10.00
4.89
7.37
6.45

Anti-director right
4
3
5
2
1
2
3
5
2
5
2
4
2
1
4
2
4
3
4
3
2
3
5
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Legal origin
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

Institutional clusters
3
3
2
2
2
2
3
1
3
1
2
1
3
2
1
3
2
1
2
2

Table 2
Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations
Panel A. Descriptive statistics
Variable
EM
BDIND
INVP
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
XLS
BIG4
OWNC
IFRS

N
629
629
629
629
629
629
629
629
629
629
629

Mean
1.06
0.70
8.45
2.34
6.82
0.13
0.12
0.20
0.12
0.37
0.45

Median
0.48
0.75
9.05
1.81
6.70
0.11
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.31
0.00

Std
2.21
0.18
1.65
2.08
2.06
0.13
0.32
0.40
0.33
0.16
0.50

Q1
0.21
0.57
7.72
1.03
5.40
0.02
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.24
0.00

Q3
0.91
0.86
9.51
3.02
8.27
0.21
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.52
1.00

Panel B. Pearson correlations
Variable

INVP

MB

SIZE

LEV

LOSS

XLS

BDIND
INVP

0.06

0.10***
0.09*

0.24***
0.04

0.18***
0.03

-0.03
0.03

0.27***
0.22***

0.09*

0.09†

-0.07†

0.04

MB
SIZE

0.28***

LEV
LOSS
XLS
BIG4

BIG4

OWNC

IFRS

0.15***
0.23***

-0.01
-0.43***

0.01
0.30***

0.00

-0.02

0.19***

-0.20***

0.15***

†

-0.27***

0.33***

0.08

-0.03

0.09*

0.05

-0.09*

0.07†

0.07†

0.09*
0.61***

0.05
-0.19***

-0.06
-0.09*

-0.28***

-0.33***
-0.17***

OWNC

EM : earnings management, measured as the ratio of the absolute value of accruals to the absolute value of cash
flow from operations,
BDIND: board independence, measured as the proportion of outside directors on the board,
MB: market-to-book ratio, measured as the ratio of the market value of common equity to the book value of
common equity,
SIZE: firm size, measured as the logarithm value of total assets,
LEV: financial leverage, measured as the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,
LOSS: loss-making dummy, coded “1” if a firm is making loss and “0” otherwise,
XLS: cross listing, coded “1” if a firm is cross listed on a U.S. stock exchange and “0” otherwise,
INVP: investor protection, measured by legal enforcement scores, i.e., the average of three measures
from La Porta et al. (1998): (1) the efficiency of the judicial system, (2) the rule of law, and (3) level of corruption in
a country (Leuz et al., 2003).
BIG4: Big 4 auditor, coded “1” if a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor and “0” otherwise.
OWNC: ownership concentration, measured by ownership concentration scores from La Porta et al. (1998).
IFRS: IFRS adoption, coded “1” if a country has mandatorily adopted IFRS and “0” otherwise.
†
p < .10 (two-tailed).
* p < .05 (two-tailed).
*** p < .001 (two-tailed).
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Table 3
Results on testing H1
Variable
Intercept
BDIND
INVP
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
XLS
BIG4
OWNC
IFRS

Predicted sign
?
+
?
+
+
?
-

Coefficient
2.54
-1.23
-0.24
0.02
-0.05
0.59
1.62
-0.26
-1.37
-1.18
-0.27

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

t-statistic
4.90***
-2.40**
-2.10*
0.59
-0.87
0.84
5.78***
-0.81
-2.35***
-1.76*
-1.12
629
5.69***
8.85%

INVP is standardized as: (INVP-Mean) / Std = (INVP – 8.45) / 1.65.
The regression model is as follows:
EM = b0 + b1 BDIND + b2 INVP + b3 MB + b4 SIZE + b5 LEV + b6 LOSS + b7 XLS +b8 BIG4 + b9 OWNC
+ b10 IFRS + Dominance country dummies + ε
(1)
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
** p < .01 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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Table 4
Results on testing H2
Variable
Intercept
BDIND
INVP
BDIND*INVP
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
XLS
BIG4
OWNC
IFRS

Predicted sign
?
?
?
?
+
?
+
+
?
-

Coefficient
2.53
-1.24
-0.16
-0.11
0.03
-0.04
0.58
1.62
-0.26
-1.37
-1.17
-0.27

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

t-statistic
4.88***
-2.41**
-0.42
-0.22
0.61
-0.84
0.83
5.78***
-0.81
-2.34**
-1.75*
-1.12
629
5.28***
8.71%

INVP is standardized as: (INVP-Mean) / Std = (INVP – 8.45) / 1.65.
The regression model is as follows:
EM = b0 + b1 BDIND + b2 INVP + + b3 BDIND*INVP +b4 MB + b5 SIZE + b6 LEV + b7 LOSS + b8 XLS
+b9 BIG4 + b10 OWNC + b11 IFRS + Dominance country dummies + ε
(2)
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
** p < .01 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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Table 5
Results on income smoothing
H1
Variable
Intercept
BDIND
INVP
BDIND*INVP
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
XLS
BIG4
OWNC
IFRS

Predicted sign
?
+
?
+
+
?
-

Coefficient
0.77
-0.14
-0.04
0.01
0.02
0.13
-0.11
-0.13
-0.25
-0.19
-0.06

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

H2

t-statistic
8.06***
-1.44†
-1.66*
1.55†
2.54**
0.99
-2.06*
-2.19*
-1.78*
-1.51†
-1.33†
613
3.46***
4.97%

†

p < .10 (one-tailed).
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
** p < .01 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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Coefficient
0.77
-0.14
-0.01
-0.04
0.01
0.02
0.13
-0.10
-0.13
-0.25
-0.19
-0.06

t-statistic
8.03***
-1.46†
-0.13
-0.40
1.58†
2.56**
0.98
-2.03*
-2.19*
-1.77*
-1.49†
-1.33†
613
3.22***
4.84%

Table 6
Results on signed accruals
H1
Variable
Intercept
BDIND
INVP
BDIND*INVP
MB
SIZE
LEV
LOSS
XLS
BIG4
OWNC
IFRS

Predicted sign
?
+
?
+
+
?
-

Coefficient
1.57
-0.44
-0.08
-0.03
-0.00
0.27
-0.07
-0.18
-0.64
-0.54
-0.21

N
F-statistic
Adj. R2

H2

t-statistic
4.02***
-1.15
-0.88
-1.06
-0.01
0.51
-0.33
-0.75
-1.15
-1.07
-1.15
629
1.16
0.33%

†

p < .10 (one-tailed).
* p < .05 (one-tailed).
*** p < .001 (one-tailed).
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Coefficient
1.52
-0.44
0.35
-0.64
-0.03
-0.00
0.26
-0.06
-0.13
-0.28
-0.69
-0.14

t-statistic
3.94***
-1.15
1.24
-1.68*
-1.01
0.05
0.49
-0.29
-0.56
-0.93
-1.49†
-0.90
629
1.51†
0.89%

